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1. Background: Pay-for-delay agreements in the spotlight for the past ten 
years 
 
Pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical industry have, for the past few years 
caught the attention of competition authorities, and, in particular, of the European 
Commission: following its 2008-2009 sector inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector
2
, the 
European Commission found that settlement agreements between originators/innovators or 
patent holders and generic manufacturers were delaying the entry in the market of generic 
drugs, even after the expiry of the originator’s patent. These agreements, usually reached as 
part of patent litigation settlements, can entail a payment or a transfer of economic value 
between a soon-to-expire patent owner (the innovator or manufacturer of the originator 
medicine) and a generics manufacturer, the effect of which is to cause a delay in the entry 
in the market of the generic; in such cases, the European Commission argues, there is an 
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infringement of Article 101 TFEU
3
, as the companies involved will have reached an 
agreement the object of which is to restrict competition. Most notably, once such an 
agreement is qualified as an infringement by object, the Commission will not be required to 
show anticompetitive effects in the market
4
. 
Indeed, in the sector inquiry, the Commission reviewed several iterations of these 
agreements, and found that in general agreements that pose no restriction on the ability of 
the generic manufacturer, or that while restricting their entry in the market, do not entail any 
transfer of value through a reverse payment (so-called “Type A” and “Type B-I” agreements) 
should not be deemed restrictive of competition, while “Type B-II” agreements, where a 
restriction on the ability of the generic manufacturer to enter in the market is compensated 
with a reverse payment
5
, should constitute an infringement of competition rules by object, 
as the reverse payment would be tantamount to a profit-sharing agreement between the 
originator and the generic manufacturer resulting from a delay in the latter’s entry in the 
market.   
As a consequence of these findings, the European Commission started a detailed 
monitoring of patent settlements which led to a series of high-profile investigations (and 
fines worth several hundred of million euros for art. 101 TFEU infringements): Lundbeck – 
Citalopram (case AT.39226, Commission Decision of 19 June 2013), Johnson&Johnson – 
Fentanyl (case AT.39685, Commission Decision of 10 December 2013), Servier - Perindopril 
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(case AT.39612, Commission Decision of 9 July 2014) and, most recently, Teva – Modafinil 
(case AT.39686, Commission Decision of 26 November 2020)
6
. 
So far, the European Union General Court (“General Court”) has already issued its 
judgements on the Lundbeck – Citalopram and on the Servier – Perindopril cases, upholding 
the European Commission’s decision
7
. Those decisions were appealed to the Court of Justice, 
which is expected to deliver its final rulings in 2021, but  offers a preview of the 
Court’s framework of review for  agreements
8
, and has already been extensively 




2. Background to Paroxetine 
 
 resulted from a reference for a preliminary ruling under art. 267 TFEU from 
the CAT, in proceedings opposing GSK and five generics manufacturers on the one hand, and 
the CMA on the other, in relation to the CMA’s decision of 12 February 2016 finding that the 
six companies had taken part in unlawful agreements under the Competition Act 1998 (the 
UK competition law) and Article 101 (and 102) TFEU, concerning several settlement 
agreements entered into by GSK with those generic manufacturers to put an end to litigation 
concerning GSK’s paroxetine related patents.  
In this case, while the originator’s patent for the active ingredient of paroxetine had 
already expired, the originator’s manufacturing process patents were still valid: generics 
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manufacturers could therefore enter in the market for paroxetine, as long as they did not 
infringe patented manufacturing processes: ensuing attempts from generics manufacturers 
to enter the market resulted in litigation around the issue of generics manufacturers 
impinging on GSK’s patents, to questions raised by the generics companies on the validity of 
the patents themselves. This litigation would eventually be settled when GSK offered 
payments to the generics companies in exchange for their desisting from patent invalidity 
claims and for not marketing paroxetine rival products in the UK market; in addition, GSK 
arranged for its exclusive distributor of paroxetine in the UK to supply the generics companies 
with paroxetine for resale in the UK with a guaranteed profit margin. 
The CMA found that these agreements resulted in an infringement to competition, as 
these generic companies were in effect potential competitors with the originator manufacturer 
and had agreed to delay (albeit for a certain period) their entry in the market, where they 
would be able to compete with the originator’s branded medicine, in exchange for a payment 
or transfer of an economic value. 
Faced with appeals from the six companies and with the Commission’s own cases on 
pay-for-delay agreements still waiting a final decision from the Court of Justice
10
, the CAT 
decided to request guidance from the Court of Justice.  
 
3. The Court’s findings 
 
a. Potential competition      
On the issue of potential competition, the Court recalled settled case law according to 
which in order to find an infringement of Article 101 (1) TFUE in relation to horizontal 
agreements, coordination must take place between companies which are competitors, at least 
potentially: for an horizontal agreement to have a “negative and appreciable effect on 
competition within the internal market”, it must involve undertakings operating at the same 
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However, in this case, the companies were not actually competing: the generics 
manufacturers had announced their intentions to enter in the market for paroxetine, but their 
actions were thwarted by the originator’s legal actions to enforce its patents; they settled 
with the originator before competing. This is why the Court very clearly states that “it is only 
the concept of ‘potential competition’ that is at issue, given that the manufacturers of generic 
medicines who concluded the agreements at issue with GSK had not entered the market for 
paroxetine at the time when those agreements were concluded.”
12
  
The assessment of the Court reads out as a clear roadmap for assessing potential 
competition, while providing the referring court the tools to evaluate which criteria to use 
when determining when a company not present in a market is a potential competitor of 
another company already present in that market: firstly, the court must consider the structure 
of the market and the economic and legal context in which it operates, and in a case 
concerning the pharmaceutical sector, pay special attention to the regulatory constraints that 
play a significant role in the competitive assessment in this sector; secondly, intellectual 
property rights must also be considered, in light of their legal protection under EU Law; 
thirdly, the “perception of the established operator”
13
 must also be accounted for: if the 
originator agrees to make transfers of value to a manufacturer or generics in exchange for a 
delay in its market entry, there is a clear indication that the originator regards the generic 
manufacturer as a potential competitor, and, as the Court points out, “the greater the transfer 
of value, the stronger the indication”
14
.  
Once all these are factored in, then the referring court may consider if the generics 
manufacturer had taken the necessary steps to have access to the market (including at 
regulatory, supply and distribution levels), if it had challenged the originator’s patents and 
if it had adopted a marketing strategy aiming at challenging the market, in order to conclude 
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Finally, the challenger must not meet “barriers to entry that are insurmountable”
16
: as 




Here, the Court takes some care in explaining that competition law does not thwart 
patent law nor intellectual property rights, nor that special consideration should not be given 
to the legal protection afforded by these rights by the referring court. The point is that the 
issue of patent protection is not an obstacle for a challenger to take all necessary steps to 
enter the market, namely as soon as the patent expires or its validity is successfully 
challenged, and therefore is no obstacle to its qualification as a potential competitor.   
 
b. Restriction by object 
Arguably, the Court’s findings in relation to the qualification of these agreements as 
restrictions by object are the most relevant part of the decision: not in respect of any 
additional clarification to the notion of restriction by object, but for reaffirming a coherent 
case law that has been outlined since the Cartes Bancaires judgement in 2014
18
: the category 
of object restrictions must be interpreted strictly and regard to the legal and economic context 
in which the companies operate must be an integral part of the assessment of the agreements 
or concerted practices under discussion; at the same time, restrictions by object are not a 
closed set of behaviors, as any agreement can be considered a restriction by object if it is 
inherently deleterious to competition. This is an admittedly high bar to pass, in particular in 
what concerns “non-cartel” agreements, where the inherent damage to competition is easier 
to demonstrate. Finally, the inherent damage to competition must be assessed taking full 
consideration of the context in which the parties to the agreement operate. 
It is therefore relevant to note that the Court starts is assessment by stating what these 
agreements are not: market-sharing or market-exclusion agreements
19
. In fact, the Court 
concluded that the part of the agreements ending the patent disputes was genuine, and as 
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such could not be regarded as an agreement bringing to an end “entirely fictitious disputes”
20
 
or aiming at market-sharing or exclusion.  
Additionally, and in a somewhat convoluted way, the Court recalled that the exercise of 
an intellectual property right, under some circumstances, might fall under the prohibition of 
Article 101 (1) TFEU
21
, that the prohibition does not make a distinction between agreements 
whose purpose is to put an end to litigation and those concluded with other aims
22
, that 
settlement agreements whereby a company accepts the validity of a patent and delay their 
entry in the market are liable to have effects that restrict competition
23
, and that an 
agreement providing that a patent will not be challenged may also restrict competition within 
the meaning of Article 101 (1) TFEU
24
; however – and this is the relevant finding – not all 
settlement agreements whereby a generics manufacturer, having assessed its chances of 
successfully challenging the validity of the patent, decided to abandon its plans to enter the 
market and settle with the originator manufacturer are restrictions by object
25
.  
It is worthwhile noting that in paras. 77 to 83 of the judgement, the Court is essentially 
guiding the referring court through the minutiae of competition law: not all agreements 
between competing undertakings are restrictions of competition; and not all restrictions of 
competition are restriction by object. 
If all settlement agreements may not be deemed restrictions of competition, the Court 
then proceeds to assess the defining feature of these pay-for-delay agreements: the actual 
payment or transfer of value of economic nature between two companies as part of their 
litigation settlement. 
Here the Court takes again a very cautious approach: the fact that such an agreement 
involves a transfer of value is not, in itself, sufficient to qualify it as a restriction by object, 
since “those transfers of value may prove to be justified, that is, appropriate and strictly 
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Only in cases where there is no other justification for the payment other than the interest 
of the parties in putting competition aside should the referring court find a restriction of 
competition by object.  
Thus, all transfers of value (pecuniary and not pecuniary) between the two companies 
have to be individually assessed to determine if the value transferred to the generics 
manufacturer is shown to be “sufficiently beneficial to encourage the manufacturer of generic 
medicines to refrain from entering the market concerned and not to compete on the merits”
27
 
(even if below the value of the profits the generics manufacturer would generate following 
entry in the market), thus meriting the qualification of restriction by object. 
Finally, the Court addressed the reconciliation of the notion of restriction of competition 
by object with the evaluation of pro-competitive effects resulting from those settlements.  
This is arguably one of the most controversial – and possibly least understood – points 
in the mechanics of application of Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU: Article 101 (1) TFEU prohibits 
agreements that restrict competition; Article 101 (3) TFEU allows for hitherto prohibited 
agreements in light of their positive economic outcome. If positive competitive effects are to 
be weighed when applying Article 101 (1) TFEU, what is then the point of Article 101 (3) 
TFEU? 
Here, the Court followed closely Advocate General KoKott’s opinion
28
: firstly, legitimate 
objectives may, under certain circumstances, authorize agreements, even if they restrict 
competition; secondly, the case law mandates that agreements have to be assessed in 
context, i.e, the agreement must be assessed in the circumstances of the individual case 
having regard to all relevant factors; thirdly, if the benefits resulting from an agreement give 
rise to question its anticompetitive object, than the assessment must move to an analysis of 
the effects; fourthly, positive effects secondary to an agreement do not warrant an effects 
analysis, once it is clear that they were not the primary aim of the parties. 
In conclusion, the Court found that positive effects have be considered when applying 
Article 101 (1) TFEU, as they are “elements of the context of that agreement”
29
 : but they 
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have to be demonstrated, relevant and specifically related to the agreement in order to 
determine a switch to an effects analysis (thus precluding a finding of an object restriction), 
or, at least, to cast a “reasonable doubt” as to whether the settlement agreement caused a 
sufficient degree of harm to competition
30
. 
While it is for the referring court to assess such effects, the Court did go so far as to assert 
that, in this case, the positive effects brought about by the settlement agreements were “not 




4. Conclusion   
 
The Court’s position in  should not be overestimated
32
.  
 reaffirms the Court’s case law on the relationship between Competition Law 
and intellectual property rights, while signaling that their legitimate exercise by patent 
holders may indeed restrict competition and be caught be the prohibition of Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. It confirms that the qualification of any restriction as an object restriction should not 
be regarded by competition authorities as a competition policy instrument to be used 
whenever an agreement impinges on the parties’ freedom, regardless of the contextual 
circumstances in which the parties operate and presents a clear overview of the contextual 
analysis warranted for agreements which fail to be easily qualified as market-sharing or 
collusion-like agreements.  
The judgement clarifies the legal tests for  agreements to be reviewed by 
the European Commission and national competition authorities in a more nuanced, and 
balanced, perspective than a pure by object approach would suggest.  
This should impact not only forthcoming rulings by the Court of Justice in  and 
, but importantly it clearly signals what the Court expects the competition authorities 
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to adhere to in their investigations to complex agreements and arrangements between 
companies, including horizontal cooperation agreements.  
 
  
              
